Anshari Taslim
Detroit, MI – The Detroit Pistons face a critical juncture following their elimination from the NBA playoffs, concluding a season that highlighted significant systemic flaws and raised urgent questions about the team’s foundational philosophy. Despite reaching the postseason, the Pistons’ deep run ended with a decisive Game 7 loss to the Cleveland Cavaliers, exposing a roster construction rooted in a historical identity that now appears outdated in the contemporary NBA.
For nearly four decades, the Pistons have consistently built teams around a defensive-minded ethos, a legacy harkening back to their "Bad Boys" era. Since 1987, the franchise has made 11 conference finals appearances, with their defense never ranking lower than seventh in any of those seasons, according to Basketball Reference. However, their offense frequently lagged, ranking 10th or lower in five of those campaigns. The recently concluded 2025-26 season saw the team fall into this familiar pattern, relying heavily on defensive prowess while struggling significantly on the offensive end.
This approach, while historically successful for Detroit, proved unsustainable in the modern playoff landscape. The team’s core, inherited by President of Basketball Operations Trajan Langdon two years ago, was seemingly managed with a patient developmental strategy, akin to the 2023-24 Oklahoma City Thunder. The Thunder opted to nurture their young, organically grown talent through a top-seeded playoff run before making drastic changes, a strategy that ultimately led them to a championship. The Pistons emulated this patience, hoping their youthful core, centered around All-Star guard Cade Cunningham, would similarly mature.
However, the outcomes diverged sharply. While Oklahoma City’s playoff exit revealed minor, immediately addressable issues, Detroit’s journey exposed far more serious, philosophical shortcomings. The Pistons narrowly avoided a historic first-round upset, with a Franz Wagner injury granting them a reprieve against a No. 8 seed. They then squandered a 2-0 second-round lead against the Cavaliers, culminating in a blowout Game 7 defeat. The key takeaway from the season is unambiguous: unlike 2004, championship aspirations in the current NBA demand a high-functioning offense.
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Persistent Offensive Deficiencies
A central issue plaguing the Pistons throughout the season and into the playoffs was their glaring offensive inefficiency, particularly in half-court sets. Data from Cleaning the Glass, which tracks half-court offensive efficiency since the Pistons’ 2003-04 championship season, illustrates this challenge. Since that era, only four teams ranking in the bottom half of half-court points per play have reached the NBA Finals, a stark indicator that playoff success is increasingly tied to effective scoring in slower, grind-it-out offensive scenarios.
The front office’s reluctance to aggressively address these offensive shortcomings has been a recurring theme. Under former general manager Troy Weaver, the team’s 2023-24 squad won only 14 games, partly due to a refusal to add veteran shooters. Langdon, while making minimal additions like Tobias Harris, Tim Hardaway Jr., and Malik Beasley (later replaced by Duncan Robinson and Caris LeVert), did not fundamentally alter the team’s offensive profile. The Pistons maintained one of the NBA’s lowest 3-point attempt rates, and their offense consistently dipped by over nine points per 100 possessions whenever Cunningham was off the floor.
The trade deadline offered an opportunity to bolster the roster, but Langdon notably opted to acquire draft capital rather than spend it, moving up seven slots in the upcoming June draft through a swap with Minnesota. While Kevin Huerter was acquired, his previous postseason struggles limited his impact. Analysts have pointed to several available players who could have provided much-needed shooting and creation, including Michael Porter Jr., Trey Murphy III, Lauri Markkanen, and Anfernee Simons. Even lower-cost options like Chicago’s Ayo Dosunmu or Coby White, who were available without demanding a first-round pick, could have offered immediate relief.
Cade Cunningham’s Unmanageable Burden
The Pistons’ mid-postseason surge was largely predicated on an unsustainable two-week stretch by Tobias Harris, who averaged 23.2 points on impressive shooting splits across five crucial wins. When Harris reverted to his statistical norms, the team’s secondary offense collapsed, placing an immense burden on Cade Cunningham.
Through Game 6 of the Cleveland series, Cunningham’s postseason usage rate was among the league’s highest, trailing only Joel Embiid and Jaylen Brown. However, Cunningham’s workload was magnified by his minutes played (over 41 per game, compared to Embiid’s 33 and Brown’s 35.6) and his disproportionate playmaking responsibilities, registering more than twice as many assists as any teammate. Compounding this was his assignment to defend elite guards like James Harden and Donovan Mitchell, creating a truly gargantuan workload.
The toll on Cunningham was evident. Detroit’s late-game offense frequently stagnated, most notably during its Game 5 collapse against Cleveland, where late double-teams further exhausted the young star. The absence of a reliable secondary creator or shooter meant that even the late-series insertion of Marcus Sasser, providing a modicum of ball-handling and shooting, made a noticeable difference. However, the core issue remained: two of the Pistons’ three most important players (Jalen Duren and Ausar Thompson, implied) are non-shooters, a fundamental mismatch with modern offensive requirements.
The Duren-Thompson Conundrum
The playoff performance of young big man Jalen Duren highlighted another critical concern. Through Game 6 of the Cleveland series, Duren’s scoring average plummeted by nine points per game compared to the regular season, a decline not seen since Wilt Chamberlain in 1962, according to Underdog NBA. His rebounding rates also fell significantly, and his defensive discipline was notably inconsistent, frequently being drawn away from the rim by non-shooting bigs like Wendell Carter Jr. and Evan Mobley.
A key factor in Duren’s struggles appeared to be his on-court pairing with Ausar Thompson. Data from Databallr indicated that Duren was substantially more effective without Thompson on the floor, averaging 2.8 more points and 0.8 fewer turnovers per 75 possessions, with his true-shooting percentage jumping over 10 points. With both Thompson and Duren on the court, Detroit’s half-court offense averaged a mere 88.4 points per 100 plays in its first 13 playoff games, significantly worse than the league’s worst regular-season half-court offense (91.6 by the Brooklyn Nets). When Duren played without Thompson, that figure surged to 104.4. The Pistons registered a -0.5 net rating in Duren-Thompson minutes but a +6.9 net rating when Duren played without Thompson.
Opposing teams capitalized on this dynamic. Orlando’s unusual size allowed them to switch pick-and-rolls involving Duren and Cunningham, neutralizing Duren’s hard rolls to the rim. Cleveland’s Evan Mobley could lurk in the paint without guarding Thompson, further crowding the interior. Jalen Suggs of Orlando often played as a free safety, disrupting Detroit’s off-ball actions and preventing clean entry passes to Duren. The paint became prohibitively crowded, impacting Duren’s confidence and shot-making; his points per shot on layups dropped from 1.24 in the regular season to 0.89 in the playoffs.
The coaching staff’s diminishing confidence in Duren was palpable. In a pivotal Game 5, coach JB Bickerstaff made the unconventional decision to play Paul Reed, the team’s third-string center, for all 17 minutes of the fourth quarter and overtime, despite not utilizing him at all in the first three quarters.
The Pistons’ strategic gamble—that the sheer volume of possessions generated by Duren and Thompson through offensive rebounds, turnovers, and defensive stops would compensate for lower points per play—proved insufficient against playoff-level defenses. While their offensive rebounding rate with the duo was exceptional, and Thompson’s ability to generate transition offense was evident (contributing to 20 first-half fast-break points in Game 5), elite, low-turnover teams like the Cavaliers could stifle this advantage by forcing half-court possessions.
The challenge of integrating multiple non-shooters into a playoff lineup is not unique to Detroit. Amen Thompson, Ausar’s twin brother, faces similar issues in Houston. Even the Denver Nuggets encountered difficulties when Nikola Jokic’s 3-point shooting dipped and Christian Braun struggled from deep against a Minnesota team that dared them to shoot while taking away the rim.
Imminent Offseason Decisions
With the "breakfast" period of player development now concluded, the Pistons must definitively address their roster. The immediate priority is providing Cunningham with more shooting and another high-level creator. However, the financial realities of the NBA demand a more immediate resolution for the Duren-Thompson situation than the team might prefer.
Jalen Duren is eligible for a restricted free agent max contract if he makes All-NBA, a likely scenario. Before the playoffs, the Pistons might have readily committed to this. Now, the fit questions raise concerns, pushing for a more traditional negotiation. Restricted free agency often allows teams to secure more team-friendly deals, as rival offers can be matched, tying up cap space for potential suitors. However, if a team like the Lakers or Bulls, both in dire need of centers and projected to have max-level cap space, overlooks Duren’s playoff struggles, the Pistons could face a dilemma: commit to an onerous contract for a potentially ill-fitting player, or lose a 22-year-old All-NBA talent for no compensation.
Alternatively, the Pistons could preemptively move Ausar Thompson to create a more favorable environment for Duren or to acquire a star-level creator for Cunningham. Thompson demonstrated higher peaks in the postseason, but also significant lows, including excessive fouling and costly turnovers. His defensive impact, however, is undeniable; in the first six games against Cleveland, Donovan Mitchell and James Harden shot a combined 4-of-28 as Thompson’s primary defender, according to NBA.com tracking data. Thompson’s defensive prowess is central to Detroit’s identity, as the team led the league in turnovers generated per 100 possessions.
Accommodating Thompson’s defensive strengths while mitigating his offensive limitations might involve acquiring a shooting center. The Atlanta Hawks employ a similar strategy with Dyson Daniels and Onyeka Okongwu, where Daniels functions as an offensive center and defensive wing. The Houston Rockets also experimented with Amen Thompson as a primary ball-screener alongside a shooting big like Jabari Smith when Alperen Sengun was injured, leading to an above-average half-court offense.
Viable shooting center options in the trade market are scarce. Myles Turner (Indiana) might be available if the Bucks trade Giannis Antetokounmpo, but his recent performance and contract are concerns. Karl-Anthony Towns (Minnesota) could be a target if the Knicks pursue Antetokounmpo. Internally, Isaiah Stewart, who shot over 38% from three two seasons ago but hasn’t replicated that consistency, represents a potential, albeit unreliable, solution.
The Pistons could also explore a sign-and-trade for Duren to recoup assets. The New Orleans Pelicans, now led by former Pistons GM Troy Weaver (who drafted Duren), could be a logical partner, potentially offering a player like Trey Murphy III, an offensive wing Detroit desperately needs.
Finally, the most radical option would be to let Duren walk in free agency. Removing his cap hold could free up significant cap space, potentially $30-46 million, allowing the Pistons to reshape their roster around Cunningham and Thompson through trades, even if a direct free-agent replacement for Duren is unlikely.
This offseason presents an immensely complex challenge for the Detroit Pistons. Few general managers are willing to part with a 22-year-old All-Star, but the consequences of an inflexible, expensive contract are greater than ever under the new collective bargaining agreement. The Pistons must move beyond their historical identity and modernize their approach. The era of the 1989, 1990, or 2004 Pistons is over; the franchise’s future hinges on its ability to adapt to the scoring demands of the contemporary NBA.
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