Anshari Taslim
The Boston Celtics’ recent championship victory in 2024, culminating in Jaylen Brown earning both Eastern Conference Finals and NBA Finals MVP honors, paradoxically marked the beginning of a significant financial restructuring for the franchise. For years, speculation centered on the viability of Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown as a championship-winning duo. While that question was definitively answered on the court, Celtics president Brad Stevens’ comments following Brown’s subsequent trade to Philadelphia underscored a more pertinent query: "How much can you afford to pay Tatum and Brown to be your two best players if you hope to win a championship?" The financial reality, Stevens explained, dictated a change, as the combined salary cap allocation for Tatum and Brown, which stood at approximately 47% during their 2024 title run, was projected to surge to roughly 70% by 2027 and beyond. This escalating figure, driven by the 8% annual raises embedded in their supermax contracts and a slower rate of salary cap growth, highlighted a critical juncture for team construction in the modern NBA.
Historical precedent within the league strongly supports the notion that such a high percentage allocated to just two players is often untenable for championship contention. An analysis of the last 15 NBA champions, specifically focusing on the percentage of the salary cap dedicated to their two most expensive players, reveals a consistent trend. This 15-year window, starting with the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), signifies a pivotal shift in the league’s financial landscape, introducing a harsher team-building climate with revamped luxury tax formulas and, subsequently, the institution of luxury tax aprons.
Within this period, only one championship team managed to exceed 61% of the cap for its top two players: the 2021-22 Golden State Warriors, whose pairing of Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson accounted for a staggering 74.52%. This Warriors’ roster, often cited for its unprecedented financial commitment, paid its four most expensive players nearly 124% of the salary cap. Their ability to execute complex maneuvers, such as the sign-and-trade that transformed Kevin Durant’s outgoing salary into a key championship contributor like Andrew Wiggins, would likely be impossible under the more stringent rules of the second-apron era. The Warriors’ "checkbook win," as it was controversially termed, served as a catalyst for the very CBA changes that now constrain teams like the Celtics.
Excluding that Golden State anomaly, the remaining 14 champions in the last 15 years averaged just under 53.6% of their cap allocated to their two highest-paid players. This figure aligns closely with the 54.14% Boston spent on its top two earners (Jrue Holiday and Kristaps Porziņģis) during their 2024 championship season, neither of whom were Tatum or Brown. This illustrates another critical "championship cheat code" within the CBA: the ability to underpay a star-level player. Examples include Jalen Brunson (Knicks), Chet Holmgren or Jalen Williams (Thunder), and Kawhi Leonard (Raptors) during their respective championship windows, as well as Stephen Curry earlier in his career. These players, often on rookie deals or early, team-friendly extensions, provide significant surplus value, allowing teams to allocate more resources to depth and supporting talent. For the Celtics, the decision to commit approximately 35% of the cap to both Tatum and Brown meant that retaining essential role players like Holiday or Porziņģis became financially unsustainable in the long term.
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The Celtics’ willingness to explore a trade of Brown for Giannis Antetokounmpo, despite Antetokounmpo’s age and injury history, underscored their conviction that only a specific, elite combination of talents could justify two max contracts totaling 70% of the cap. Antetokounmpo’s unique skill set, particularly his rim pressure, aligned with a critical need for Boston. This dilemma is not unique; the Minnesota Timberwolves, for instance, traded Karl-Anthony Towns after their franchise’s best season, influenced by his 35% cap hit compared to Julius Randle’s 20%. They ultimately determined that the 15% difference was crucial for preserving championship-caliber depth, a decision that eventually proved detrimental. These contract-driven decisions highlight a growing trend where players, despite their talent, become "CBA casualties," traded not for performance issues but due to their escalating financial commitments within a constrained cap environment. Such trades often occur at a reduced asset cost, as other teams are wary of inheriting burdensome contracts.
De’Aaron Fox: The Spurs’ Future Financial Reckoning
San Antonio Spurs guard De’Aaron Fox, who recently signed a four-year, $221.7 million deal set to begin next season, stands as a prime candidate for a future contract-driven trade. His contract will see him earn $61.3 million in the 2029-30 season, his age-32 campaign. Fox, while an above-average starting point guard, has seen his defining attribute—elite speed—diminish slightly, and his inconsistent perimeter shooting (career 32.1% from three-point range) makes sustained star status challenging without that primary advantage. Currently, his 30% max contract is perceived by some analysts as negative value, potentially requiring the Spurs to attach additional assets to facilitate a trade.
However, the timing and circumstances are critical for San Antonio. Presently, Fox’s contract does not present an immediate cap impediment. The Spurs currently benefit from the artificially deflated contracts of their young core: Victor Wembanyama, Dylan Harper, and Stephon Castle will collectively account for only approximately 24% of the cap next season. This unique cap flexibility could position the Spurs to be a beneficiary of other teams’ "cap casualty" situations, employing a strategy of "calculated overpay." The Mikal Bridges trade to the New York Knicks exemplifies this approach: five first-round picks for a non-All-Star wing was a steep price, but Bridges’ unique combination of positional scarcity (wing), two-way playmaking, and a below-market rookie extension made him a perfect fit for the Knicks’ cap sheet. Teams with surplus cap value, like the current Spurs or the Atlanta Hawks, could leverage this market inefficiency to acquire All-NBA talent at a reduced asset cost.
This window of flexibility for the Spurs is finite. The 2026-27 season will be Wembanyama’s fourth, and if he maintains his trajectory (projected Defensive Player of the Year contender, requiring 65 games played), he will almost certainly command a 30% max contract for the 2027-28 season. Castle’s rookie extension would follow a year later, with Harper’s soon after. The 2029-30 season presents a "nightmare scenario" where all four players—Wembanyama, Harper, Castle, and Fox—could be making max money simultaneously, making roster construction untenable under current CBA rules. Consequently, the Spurs will face increasing pressure to be proactive in moving Fox. An ideal scenario would involve winning a championship next season, thereby boosting Fox’s value enough to trade him without attaching assets. Absent that, a "sooner, rather than later" mindset will likely prevail, as Fox’s aging profile could increase the cost of moving his contract in the future.
Donovan Mitchell: Cleveland’s Costly Gamble
Cleveland Cavaliers guard Donovan Mitchell’s recent four-year, $273 million contract extension, which will carry him through his age-34 season in 2030-31, has been met with considerable skepticism. While his initial extension in Cleveland was celebrated as a small-market team retaining a star, this latest deal projects Mitchell to command 37.49% of the cap in its final year. Paired with Evan Mobley, who is expected to receive an extension topping out around 32% of the 2029-30 cap, the Cavaliers face a combined cap allocation for their two primary stars that mirrors the 70% figure that prompted the Celtics’ trade of Jaylen Brown. Unlike the Tatum-Brown duo, Mitchell and Mobley have yet to reach the NBA Finals or secure a championship, raising questions about the return on such a substantial investment.
Furthermore, Cleveland’s ability to generate surplus value through other contracts is severely limited. The Cavaliers have traded numerous draft picks, hindering their capacity to acquire cost-controlled talent. Key role players like Jarrett Allen, Max Strus, Sam Merrill, and Dennis Schröder have all been signed to market-rate extensions or contracts, leaving minimal financial flexibility. The only hypothetical path to significant surplus value would involve an unlikely scenario, such as acquiring LeBron James for a minimum or mid-level exception, which is not a sustainable long-term strategy.
A potential scenario involves the Cavaliers trading Mobley in a "win-now" gambit, a move that would aim to acquire a traditional "best player on a championship team" to relegate Mitchell to a secondary role. This aligns with Boston’s consideration of trading Brown for Antetokounmpo. However, if such a move doesn’t materialize within the next year or two, and Cleveland falls out of contention, Mitchell’s contract could become a focal point for trade discussions. Mitchell’s player profile presents unique challenges for roster construction. Despite his offensive prowess, his point guard-sized frame coupled with defensive limitations against top point guards and a less-than-elite passing acumen for his position means that his team often needs to allocate another starting slot to a primary playmaker. This often weakens the overall team defense, necessitating a heavier defensive burden on the remaining three starters—a puzzle Cleveland has struggled to solve over the past four seasons.
The rapid decline in guard values, exemplified by De’Aaron Fox’s contract becoming a perceived negative value within 18 months of his trade, underscores the risk. For Mitchell, who has a history of nagging lower-body injuries, any hint of athletic decline could severely impact his trade value, making it difficult for the Cavaliers to recoup the assets they initially invested in 2022.
Paolo Banchero or Franz Wagner: Orlando’s Impending Cap Conundrum
The Orlando Magic face a unique and potentially more complex financial challenge than simply allocating 70% of the cap to two players. Their core group, including Franz Wagner, Paolo Banchero, Desmond Bane, and Jalen Suggs, is projected to command an estimated 93% of the 2027-28 salary cap. While other championship teams, like the Knicks (whose top four players were just under 99% of the cap during their championship season), have managed high allocations, the key differentiator is player value. The Knicks’ core delivered beyond their contracts, whereas the Magic’s quartet, with only one combined All-Star appearance and none currently on a clear 2027 All-Star trajectory, has yet to consistently perform at a level commensurate with such future financial commitments.
The Magic finished last season as a Play-In Tournament team and are projected similarly for the upcoming season. A repeat of last year’s performance would intensify pressure for significant roster changes, signaling that the core’s problems cannot be outrun. The Magic are projected to have approximately $40 million in second-apron room open in the 2027 offseason. However, this figure is deceptive, as it accounts for only eight players under contract and virtually no bench depth. An extension for Anthony Black, for example, would quickly erode this available cap space, rendering the team’s balance sheet untenable for building a competitive roster.
Concerns surrounding Banchero’s long-term fit and value mirror some of the issues that led to Jaylen Brown’s trade. Banchero has been criticized for poor shot selection, and publicly available all-in-one metrics often rate him lower than traditional statistics. His role as a power forward who has shown inconsistent three-point shooting, particularly outside of the playoffs, complicates roster construction. Wagner, while considered more portable due to his defensive capabilities, also struggles with shooting consistency and has had injury concerns, which could impact his trade value. Desmond Bane, despite being the least individually acclaimed of the three, was acquired at a significant cost, and his shooting ability makes him a necessary component for any remaining core.
The Magic’s substantial investment in Bane signaled an "all-in" commitment around the Banchero-Wagner core. However, if this core continues to underperform relative to its projected salary, the team may be forced to trade either Banchero or Wagner for fewer assets than they expended on Bane, solely to re-establish the depth and financial flexibility they enjoyed when their foundational players were on more affordable rookie deals. This scenario highlights the delicate balance teams must strike between investing in young talent and managing the long-term financial implications of escalating contracts within the NBA’s evolving collective bargaining landscape.
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