NBA Confronts Tanking Epidemic: League Ponders Radical Draft Reforms

The 2023-24 NBA season has largely been characterized by a wide-open championship race, significant movement at a highly active trade deadline, and even a more engaging All-Star Game. However, much of the league’s discourse has been overshadowed by the persistent issue of tanking.

The practice of intentionally losing games to secure a higher draft pick is not a new phenomenon in the NBA, with historical precedents stretching back decades. In 1984, the Houston Rockets notably played a 38-year-old Elvin Hayes for all 53 minutes of the second-to-last game of his career, a transparent maneuver in their quest to draft Hakeem Olajuwon. Similarly, in the final game of the 2005-06 season, Minnesota Timberwolves veteran Mark Madsen, who had attempted just nine 3-pointers in his entire career up to that point, remarkably launched seven from beyond the arc as the team pursued a better draft position. For many years, this strategy, while often frowned upon, remained a largely accepted if unspoken part of team rebuilding.

The landscape shifted significantly with the overt approach of Sam Hinkie and the Philadelphia 76ers, whose "Process" strategy made tanking a public and prolonged spectacle. This generated considerable backlash, prompting the league to implement substantial changes to the draft lottery formula in 2019, primarily by flattening the odds for the worst teams.

Mathematically, the value of being the worst team has arguably diminished compared to previous eras. The team with the NBA’s worst record currently holds a 14% chance at securing the No. 1 overall pick. This figure is only marginally worse than the 14.29% chance the worst team had in 1985 when the lottery system began with only seven participating teams and flat odds. The sole exception was the 1989 lottery, where nine teams each had an 11.11% chance. Yet, tanking was not widely perceived as a crisis in the same manner during the late 1980s or early 1990s. Ironically, after the Orlando Magic won back-to-back lotteries in 1992 and 1993, the NBA adjusted the system to make the odds more favorable for the league’s struggling franchises.

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The 2019 changes introduced two critical, albeit unintended, consequences. Firstly, the lottery drawing expanded from three teams to four. This meant that teams could drop as many as four spots from their projected draft position based on their record, rather than the previous maximum of three. This alteration created a defensive incentive for the league’s worst teams to lose even more aggressively. It was no longer solely about maximizing the chances for the top pick, but also about securing the highest possible draft floor. For instance, while the three worst teams share identical odds for the No. 1 pick, the third-worst team could potentially fall to No. 7 in the actual draft order—a "nightmare scenario" that incentivizes teams to aim for the absolute worst record to mitigate this risk.

Secondly, the flattening of odds effectively redistributed the lottery equity. Teams in the middle of the lottery (e.g., the fourth, fifth, or sixth-worst records) suddenly found themselves with a greater reward for getting slightly worse, as their chances at a top pick increased compared to the old system. While the truly awful teams would be bad regardless, the 2019 reforms inadvertently encouraged teams that might otherwise have competed for a lower playoff spot to intentionally decline, given the enhanced potential reward. Notably, the last two NBA lottery winners were teams that had participated in the Play-In Tournament, underscoring the significant and unforeseen impact of these changes.

In response to the growing concerns, the NBA appears poised for further action. In December, reports indicated that the league was actively exploring various measures to curb tanking. More recently, the Indiana Pacers were fined $100,000 for violating the player participation policy by resting multiple healthy players in a game against the Houston Rockets, and the Utah Jazz received a $500,000 fine for "conduct detrimental to the league" for failing to make certain players available for all games. During his All-Star media availability, Commissioner Adam Silver confirmed the league’s commitment, stating, "there is talk about every possible remedy now to stop this behavior."

While proposals such as altering rules on pick protection, preventing teams from securing top picks in consecutive years, and introducing cutoff lines for end-of-season tanking have been extensively discussed, and further flattening of odds has already demonstrated its real-world effects, the current discourse extends to more unconventional and radical solutions. The following analysis delves into some of the more imaginative concepts circulating within basketball circles, evaluating their potential viability and unintended consequences.

Player-Driven Draft Selection

One prominent suggestion involves fundamentally altering the player acquisition process by allowing prospects to choose their initial team, akin to free agency. Variations include a raffle system proposed by superagent Rich Paul or a matching system similar to medical residency placements, as pitched by veteran NBA reporter Matt Moore. The most direct version advocates for eliminating the NBA Draft entirely, making all rookies free agents. While some models might grant worse teams a larger salary cap allocation for rookies, the core principle is to remove the guarantee of a top player based solely on a team’s record.

The theoretical appeal is clear: players could land in desirable situations, and worse teams might have more money under a capped system. However, this overlooks the powerful influence of sponsors. Corporations like Nike, unconstrained by salary caps, could significantly influence player choices, directing top talent to larger markets such as Los Angeles (Lakers) or New York (Knicks) to maximize exposure and endorsements. The notion that "markets no longer matter" in the digital age is often overstated; larger markets still command more viewership and sponsor attention. Such a system would disproportionately benefit teams in highly desirable cities while severely disadvantaging small-market franchises like Memphis or Utah, which rely heavily on the draft to acquire superstar talent. The NBA already provides a mechanism for players to choose their teams—free agency—which they access as their careers progress, allowing incumbent teams to build equity with their drafted players.

A scaled-down version, where perhaps the top prospect could choose between the three worst teams, might introduce a measure of accountability for persistently poor franchises. However, the broader implementation of a player-choice system remains fundamentally skewed against small markets.

Rewarding Winning with Higher Picks

The prevailing sentiment against tanking often leads to the proposal that the draft system should incentivize winning, not losing. While the league already incentivizes winning through financial rewards, trophies, and prestige, some suggest tying draft position directly to success. While giving the NBA champion the No. 1 pick is widely dismissed, a more common idea is to award the top pick to the best team to miss the playoffs, with the draft order then working backward.

This approach, however, merely shifts the incentive to lose. Bad teams would remain bad, but teams on the cusp of the playoffs would have a strong motivation to miss the postseason or even lose Play-In Tournament games to secure a higher draft pick. Toronto Raptors President Masai Ujiri famously articulated this dilemma in 2021, questioning the value of a Play-In spot: "play-in for what? We want to win a championship here." He later called the 2021 "Tampa tank year" a "victory" because it yielded Scottie Barnes. This system would essentially trap the worst teams at the bottom, as they would lose access to the high draft picks necessary for rebuilding. With current NBA rules making top free agents increasingly rare due to looser extension policies, relying solely on free agency for talent acquisition is no longer a viable path for struggling franchises.

The Lottery Tournament Concept

A "Lottery Tournament," structured like college basketball’s March Madness, is frequently proposed for its potential for high drama and fan engagement. This tournament would involve non-playoff teams competing for draft positioning, ensuring every team plays high-stakes games annually. While its entertainment value is undeniable, several practical issues arise.

Player motivation is a key concern; NBA players may be reluctant to participate enthusiastically in a tournament that could lead to their team drafting their replacement. Financial incentives would be crucial. A novel idea suggests awarding every player on the winning team an extra year on their contract at their current salary, potentially motivating stars like Zach LaVine to compete fiercely.

Regarding format, a structure akin to the West Coast Conference Tournament, where lower seeds must win more games, could balance competition. Teams with worse records would receive higher seeds, while better non-playoff teams could still earn a top pick. To prevent "gap year" teams from exploiting the system by resting stars all season only to bring them back for the tournament, a 65-game eligibility rule (similar to NBA awards) could be applied. Alternatively, allowing G-League players to participate would reward investment in developmental structures. While potentially less fair than a traditional lottery, its entertainment value makes it an attractive proposition for a league increasingly focused on its product.

The Lottery Committee and Team Voting

Proposals for a "Lottery Committee," similar to those used for the NCAA College Football Playoff or March Madness, face significant challenges related to independence. A committee comprising media members or league officials would inevitably face accusations of bias, given financial incentives to steer top prospects to popular teams or the potential for perceived impropriety, especially if a highly anticipated prospect lands with a marquee franchise.

A more intriguing concept involves all 30 NBA teams voting on who deserves the top picks. Each team would cast a single vote, with the team receiving the most votes picking first. The rationale is rooted in "naked self-interest": teams would likely vote to give the No. 1 pick to the team they perceive as least threatening, inadvertently directing talent to genuinely struggling franchises rather than those intentionally tanking. However, this system would likely face stalemates along conference lines (East vs. West) and, crucially, would be unworkable with existing traded draft picks. The value of future picks, often traded years in advance, would be capped by the voting process, rendering many current and future trade agreements untenable.

Financial Penalties and Alternative Currencies

Suggestions to financially punish tanking teams, such as cutting them out of luxury tax distributions or offering ticket refunds to fans of losing teams, face an insurmountable hurdle: owner wealth. With individuals like Steve Ballmer, worth over $100 billion, owning NBA franchises, no feasible financial deterrent could compel them to act against what they perceive as their team’s on-court benefit. Furthermore, owners are highly unlikely to vote for measures that directly impact their own bottom line.

A more nuanced financial approach involves "fining with a different currency"—specifically, lottery odds. As argued by longtime Miami Heat beat writer Ira Winderman, rather than monetary fines, teams engaged in definable tanking behavior could surrender a predetermined number of lottery combinations. If one of these surrendered combinations is drawn, the lottery would be redone. The primary challenge lies in objectively defining "tanking behavior" without creating room for selective enforcement or conspiracy theories, given the myriad ways a team can subtly influence outcomes (e.g., managing injuries, unconventional coaching decisions).

The "Wheel" System

Proposed by Celtics executive Mike Zarren in 2014, "the wheel" concept would predetermine the draft order 30 years in advance, with each team making each pick from No. 1 to No. 30 exactly once on a fixed schedule. Team record would be irrelevant.

The most significant concern is the inevitability of a dominant team landing a top prospect, leading to considerable uproar. Prospects themselves could also manipulate the system, delaying their entry into the draft to align with a more desirable team’s pre-assigned top pick. The system’s inflexibility is another drawback; once implemented, it would be difficult to alter for decades, making it susceptible to issues like league expansion or unforeseen negative consequences. Moreover, it risks disengaging fanbases of struggling teams that have already used their high picks or know their next few picks are low, offering little immediate hope.

Multi-Season Standings and Game Outcome Choice

One idea suggests determining draft order based on a team’s cumulative record over the three preceding seasons, positing that multi-year underperformance is a clearer indicator of need. However, this could incentivize prolonged, multi-year tanking and complicate fan engagement. Setting a minimum win threshold for top-pick eligibility would introduce complexity and new incentives for teams to be "sort of bad."

Another peculiar proposal suggests that the winning team in any game could choose whether the result counts as a win or a loss. While intended to allow bad teams to play hard without jeopardizing draft position, this creates a rabbit hole of unintended consequences. Playoff contenders could be unfairly impacted by other teams’ choices, and the system would be highly exploitable, potentially leading to teams strategically resting players or altering game outcomes.

The Musical Chairs Solution

Among the more creative and potentially viable concepts is the "musical chairs" solution, where teams do not draft with their own picks. One variation, from a Bill Simmons subreddit user, suggests that the team with the worst record gets to choose another team’s first-round pick. This would reduce the incentive to overtly lose, but the public declaration of "lack of faith" in another team might be deemed uncouth by the league.

A more refined version, proposed by Twitter user @GriffinHilly, posits that teams are simply not allowed to win the lottery with their own first-round pick. If a team’s own pick is drawn in the top four, it automatically falls to fifth, and the lottery process continues. This simple rule would significantly supercharge the trade market. The worst teams would be highly motivated to trade their own picks, knowing they cannot win the lottery with them. This could lead to a surge in creative "win-now" trades and novel roster-building strategies, as teams seek to acquire other teams’ picks for a chance at a top-four selection. While a residual incentive to lose might remain (to secure a better position in trading one’s own pick for another’s), this solution largely eliminates the most visually offensive forms of tanking by removing the direct reward for being the worst team. This concept stands out as one of the more promising and implementable solutions.

Incentivizing the Play-In Tournament

A common consensus among league figures, media, and fans is that the "middle" of the standings is the worst place to be—not good enough to contend, not bad enough to secure top draft talent. To encourage teams to build upwards from this middle ground, rather than downwards, the league could introduce tangible incentives for Play-In Tournament participants.

One idea is to award the eight Play-In teams a second mid-level exception, immune to luxury tax and hard cap calculations. This would provide additional salary flexibility for acquiring talent through free agency or trades, enabling these teams to take the "next step." Alternatively, these teams could receive an extra draft pick between the first and second rounds. The goal is to reward teams that actively compete and avoid tanking, providing them with concrete tools to ascend the standings rather than viewing the Play-In Tournament as a trap. The Play-In Tournament has largely been a success, enhancing late-season competition, and integrating it with team-building advantages could further solidify its role as a stepping stone to contention.

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